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INTRODUCTION

This Article builds on the Author’s prior work investigating the
privacy and security implications of mobile application (“mobile app”)
mediated health research 1 conducted by “independent scientists, 2 citizen
*
Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD, serves as the Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman
Professor of Law and the Founding Director of the Health Law Program at the UNLV William
S. Boyd School of Law. Professor Tovino thanks Dean Jon Garon, Professor Kathy
Cerminara, and Professor Marilyn Uzdavines for the invitation to participate in Nova Law
Review's Symposium—Progression 2018: Using Law to Facilitate an Efficacious Innovation
Economy. Professor Tovino also thanks Lena Rieke, Law Library Fellow, Wiener-Rogers
Law Library, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law, for her outstanding research assistance
and Nova Law Review for its careful editorial assistance.
1.
See Sarah Moore et al., Consent Processes for Mobile App Mediated
Research: Systematic Review, J. MED. INTERNET RES. MHEALTH & UHEALTH, Aug. 2017 at 3,
4 (discussing Apple’s ResearchKit and Android’s ResearchStack, two open source
frameworks that any scientist can use to create a mobile research app); Vincent Tourraine, List
SCI.
(Feb.
1,
2016),
of
All
ResearchKit
Apps,
SHAZINO:
http://blog.shazino.com/articles/science/researchkit-list-apps/ (listing more than a dozen
mobile research apps designed using ResearchKit); About the Study, MPOWER,
http://parkinsonmpower.org/about (last visited May 1, 2019) (describing a mobile app
mediated research study that monitors the symptoms and progression of Parkinson’s disease).
2.
See Amber Dance, Solo Scientist, 543 NATURE 747, 747 (2017) (reporting
the story of Jeffrey Rose, an independent scientist who conducts research without the benefits
of a traditional bricks-and-mortar employer); Carrie Arnold, Going Rogue, SCI. (May 17,
2013, 8:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2013/05/going-rogue (reporting the story
of Ethan Perlstein, an independent scientist who engages in scientific research without
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scientists, 3 and patient researchers 4 (collectively, independent scientists) 5 as
well as [the] mobile app developers and data storage companies that support
them.” 6 As background, mobile “apps are a fast-growing category of
software typically installed on personal smartphones and wearable devices.” 7
Used for a wide range of health-related activities, including fitness, health
education, health predictions, diagnosis, health care delivery, treatment
support, chronic disease management, disease surveillance, epidemic
outbreak tracking, and health research, mobile apps have tremendous
versatility and promise. 8
university, pharmaceutical company, research institute, or government agency affiliation, and
without public funding).
3.
See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Citizen Science on Your Smartphone: An
ELSI Research Agenda, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 897, 897 (2015) (explaining that the term
citizen scientist originally referred to “nonprofessionals who assist[ed] professional scientists
by contributing observations and measurements to ongoing research enterprises;” also
explaining that the term “now includes nonprofessionals who conduct scientific experiments
of their own design independent from professional scientists;” clarifying that citizen science
has been made possible by “online crowdsourcing, big data capture strategies, and
computational analytics,” among other technological developments); Todd Sherer,
AM.:
BLOGS
(Apr.
12,
2017),
Parkinson’s
Disease
at
200,
SCI.
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/parkinsons-disease-at-200/
(referencing
technology that citizens use to participate in research investigating Parkinson’s disease).
4.
See Jenny Leese et al., Evolving Patient-Researcher Collaboration: An
Illustrative Case Study of a Patient-Led Knowledge Translation Event, J. PARTICIPATORY
MED., no. 1, 2017, at 3, 3 (discussing patient engagement in research).
5.
Paul Wicks et al., Accelerated Clinical Discovery Using Self-Reported
Patient Data Collected Online and a Patient-Matching Algorithm, 29 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 411, 411–12 (2011) (analyzing data reported on a website by patient
researchers with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”) who experimented with lithium
carbonate).
6.
Stacey A. Tovino, Going Rogue: Mobile Research Applications and the
Right to Privacy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4) (on file with
author).
7.
See Nicolas P. Terry & Tracy D. Gunter, Regulating Mobile Mental
Health Apps, 36 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 136, 137 (2018) (providing background information
regarding mobile health apps).
8.
See Valerie Gay & Peter Leijdekkers, Bringing Health and Fitness Data
Together for Connected Health Care: Mobile Apps as Enablers of Interoperability, J. MED.
INTERNET RES., Nov. 2015, at 37, 37–38 (2015) (discussing fitness and health uses of mobile
apps as well as the aggregation of such uses); Deborah Lupton & Annemarie Jutel, “It’s Like
Having a Physician in Your Pocket!” A Critical Analysis of Self-Diagnosis Smartphone Apps,
133 SOC. SCI. & MED. 128, 128–30 (2015) (analyzing diagnostic uses of mobile apps,
including the effects such apps have on the physician-patient relationship and medical
authority in relation to diagnosis); Elaine O. Nsoesie et al., New Digital Technologies for the
Surveillance of Infectious Diseases at Mass Gathering Events, 21 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY &
INFECTION 134, 134–35 (2015) (focusing on disease surveillance uses of mobile apps and
other digital technologies); Ben Underwood et al., The Use of a Mobile App to Motivate
Evidence-Based Oral Hygiene Behaviour, 219 BRIT. DENTAL J. 166, 166 (2015) (reporting the
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This Article focuses on independent scientists, citizen scientists, and
patient researchers who use mobile apps to conduct or participate in health
research. 9 As background, an independent scientist—also known as a rogue
or lone scientist—is an individual who engages in scientific research without
university, pharmaceutical company, research institute, government agency,
or other third-party affiliation. 10 A citizen scientist—also known as a
community scientist, crowd scientist, or amateur scientist—is a member of
the general public who engages in scientific work, often in collaboration with
or under the direction of a professional, affiliated scientist and the scientist’s
academic or other institution. 11 Citizen scientists also include nonprofessionally trained scientists who independently conduct their own
experiments, frequently with the assistance of mobile apps, online
crowdsourcing, computational analytics, and other technologies made
possible by big data. 12 A patient researcher is a current or former patient
who initiates or assists research at any stage of the research process,
including establishing the research agenda, designing the research protocol,
collecting data, and disseminating research results. 13 Mobile apps have been
tremendously helpful to independent scientists, citizen scientists, and patient
researchers, as well as conventional scientists who fall outside traditional
results of a study assessing user perceptions of an oral health app that provides oral health
education and oral health behavioral support); Sharon Parmet, App Developed at UIC to Track
Mood, Predict Bipolar Disorder Episodes, UIC TODAY (Jan. 15, 2019, 2:32 PM),
http://www.today.uic.edu/app-developed-at-uic-to-track-mood-predict-bipolar-disorderepisodes (explaining that the mobile app BiAffect “unobtrusively monitors keyboard
dynamics metadata, such as typing speed and rhythm, mistakes in texts, and the use of
backspace and auto-correct” and that such data is then “analyzed using an artificial
intelligence-based machine learning approach to identify digital biomarkers of manic and
depressive episodes in people with bipolar disorder”); Sarah Peddicord, FDA in Brief: FDA
Launches New Digital Tool to Help Capture Real World Data from Patients to Help Inform
Regulatory
Decision-Making,
FDA
(Nov.
6,
2018),
http://www.fda.gov/newsEvents/newsroom/FDAInBrief/ucm625228.htm (“announcing the
MyStudies app, . . . a new mobile technology designed to foster the collection of real world
evidence via patients’ mobile devices” for health research and other purposes).
9.
See discussion infra Parts II–IX.
10.
See James Lovelock, James Lovelock: We Need Lone Scientists,
INDEPENDENT: INDY/LIFE (Mar. 26, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.independant.co.uk/lifestyle/health-and-families/features/james-lovelock-we-need-lone-scientists-9215280.html
(comparing affiliated scientists, who work in large corporations or for the government, with
lone, or independent, scientists who work alone in their own laboratories).
11.
See Rothstein et al., supra note 3, at 897; Citizen Science, OXFORD
DICTIONARY, http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/citizen_science (last visited May
1, 2019) (defining citizen scientist).
12.
Rothstein et al., supra note 3, at 897 (explaining the development of the
term citizen scientist).
13.
See Leese et al., supra note 4, at 3 (discussing patient engagement in
research).
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regulation—collectively, independent scientists—in the conduct of a wide
range of health research projects.14
As explained in the Author’s other work, independent scientists who
use mobile apps to conduct health research collect a wide variety of data
regarding their research participants’ health including, but not limited to,
data regarding sexual health, 15 occupational health, 16 neurological health, 17
and cardiovascular health. 18 As one might imagine, this voluminous and
diverse health data may be at risk of privacy and security breaches, leading
to dignitary, psychological, and economic harms for which the mobile
research participants have few legally enforceable rights or remedies due to a
lack of regulation and applicable standards. 19
In a forthcoming publication, the Author analyzes existing federal
statutes and regulations designed to protect the privacy and/or security of
health data, including data generated in the research context.20 In that article,
the Author shows that a variety of federal authorities, including the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Administrative
Simplification Rules, 21 the Common Rule, 22 and the Federal Trade
14.
See Elizabeth Klemick, Mobile Apps for Citizen Science, SMITHSONIAN
SCI. EDUC. CTR. (July 15, 2018), http://www.ssec.si.edu/stemvisions-blog/mobile-appscitizen-science. “An abundance of mobile apps makes participation in citizen science projects
easier than ever and allows data entry in the field.” Id.
15.
See Tovino, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing Kinsey Reporter, a mobile
research app that collects sexual health data from research participants).
16.
See id. at 10–11 (discussing Active Day and Fall Safety Pro, two mobile
apps that collect fall data from workers, such as painters and roofers, who experience falls
from height).
17.
See id. at 11–12 (discussing Patients Like Me, a mobile app that collects
all types of health data, including Parkinson’s symptoms and other neurological health data,
and discloses that data for research purposes).
18.
See id. at 13 (discussing MyFitnessPal, a mobile app that collects health
and fitness data and discloses that data for research purposes).
19.
See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(explaining that the mobile app Yelp exceeded the scope of its users’ consent when it
uploaded its users’ contacts data without explicit permission); Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical
Issues in Big Data Health Research, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 426–27 (2015) (discussing
physical and dignitary harms associated with the loss of privacy in the context of big data
health research); Zeynep Tufekci, The Latest Data Privacy Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/opinion/strava-privacy.html (reporting the mobile
exercise app Strava, which inadvertently revealed the secret locations of American military
bases and service members).
20.
See Tovino, supra note 6, at 16–17 (analyzing existing federal statutes and
regulations designed to protect the privacy and/or security of health data).
21.
See id. at 2–3, 16–17; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
201 (2012)); Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226, 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
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Commission Act, 23 either: (1) do not apply to mobile app mediated health
research conducted by independent scientists; or (2) fail to establish
comprehensive data privacy and security standards that will drive the
implementation of privacy and security best practices by independent
scientists. 24
In response to these lapses in federal regulation, many academics
and practitioners have suggested new federal laws or amendments to existing
federal laws in an attempt to create comprehensive privacy and security
standards that, once implemented, may help protect otherwise unprotected
data. 25 It is not clear, however, whether the federal government has the
42 U.S.C.). HHS’s privacy regulations, which implement section 264(c) of HIPAA, are
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534 (2018). 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–.534 (2018). HHS’s
security regulations, which implement section 262(a) of HIPAA [42 U.S.C. § 1320d–2(d)(1)],
are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318. Id. §§ 164.302–.318. HHS’s breach notification
regulations, which implement section 13402 of HITECH [42 U.S.C. § 17932], are codified at
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414. Id. §§ 164.400–.414. Collectively, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the
HIPAA Security Rule, and the HIPAA Breach Notification Rules are known as the HIPAA
Administrative Simplification Rules. See id. §§ 164.302–.534.
22.
See 45 C.F.R. 46.101–409 (2018); Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497, 28,518 (June 19, 2018) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
11) (showing changes to HHS’s Common Rule with which compliance is required by July 21,
2019); Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Research Privacy Under HIPAA
and the Common Rule, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 154, 155 (2005) (explaining the application of
the Common Rule).
23.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). “Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful.” Id.
The FTC has brought legal actions against organizations that have
violated consumers’ privacy rights, or misled them by failing to maintain security
for sensitive consumer information . . . [i]n many of these cases, the FTC has
charged the defendants with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bars unfair
and deceptive acts and practices in or affecting commerce.

Privacy and Security Enforcement, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement (last visited May 1,
2019).
24.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b) (2018); Sharona Hoffman, Citizen
Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big Data, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1741, 1746 (2015); Tovino, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing the application of these federal
authorities in detail and noting which apply and which contain privacy and security
standards).
25.
See David W. Bates et al., Health Apps and Health Policy: What Is
Needed?, 320 JAMA 1975, 1975 (2018). “The FDA also needs to review apps specifically
with respect to safety, protection of privacy, and false claims.” Id. “[I am] sure there will be
some major breaches that just might push the drive for national legislation over the top.”
James Swann, That Apple Watch May Show Hackers Your Heart’s Health, BLOOMBERG L.:
HEALTH L. & BUS. (Oct. 18, 2018, 6:15 AM), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/that-apple-watch-may-show-hackers-your-hearts-health [hereinafter Apple Watch]
(quoting a prominent health care attorney); James Swann, Video: Your Fitbit Steps May Not
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desire or capacity to enforce expanded or new laws in this area.26 In an
earlier publication, the Author found that a consumer complaint involving a
violation of the HIPAA Administrative Simplification Rules has a 0.1%
chance of triggering a government-imposed settlement or civil money
penalty. 27 In that same article, the Author showed that in those few cases
that go to settlement or penalty, the federal government takes a significant
amount of time—more than seven years in some cases—to execute the
settlement agreement or to impose the civil money penalty. 28 The Author
concluded that the federal desire and/or capacity to enforce the HIPAA
Administrative Simplification Rules is low, resulting in a lack of timely
attention to the privacy and security rights of individuals. 29
This Article furthers the line of research by investigating whether
state law contains comprehensive privacy, security, and breach notification
standards that could apply to independent scientists who conduct mobile app
mediated health research. 30 Focusing only on Florida law, this Article
assesses potentially relevant and applicable sources of privacy, security, and
breach notification standards for health data of the type obtained during
mobile app mediated health research studies. 31 This Article concludes that,
with one exception, Florida law tends to fall into one of two categories: (1)
the law contains at least one data privacy, security, or breach notification
standard, but the standard is limited in application to certain actors, certain
professions, or certain institutions and the law does not apply to independent
scientists, 32 or (2) the law is not necessarily limited in application, but the
law fails to establish comprehensive privacy, security, and breach

Be Protected by Federal Law, BLOOMBERG L.: NEWS (May 30, 2018), www.bna.com/videofitbit-steps-n57982093031/ [hereinafter Fitbit]. “[It is] almost certain that the federal
government will look to regulate health information [that is] not subject to HIPAA . . . .”
Fitbit, supra.
26.
See Sarah Fellay, Changing the Rules of Health Care: Mobile Health and
Challenges for Regulation, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.: TECH & INNOVATION (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.aei.org/publication/changing-the-rules-of-health-care-mobile-health-andchallenges-for-regulation/.
27.
Stacey A. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
28.
Id.
29.
See id.
30.
See discussion infra Part X.
31.
See discussion infra Part X; Tovino, supra note 6, at 9–10, 12–13
(providing several examples of health data collected by mobile research apps).
32.
FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318, 381.026, 395.001, 408.051, 456.003 (2018); see
also FLA. CONST. art I, § 23.
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notification standards that will drive the implementation of privacy and
security best practices by independent scientists. 33
As discussed in more detail below, Florida laws that fall into the first
category include the Florida Constitution, 34 Florida’s health institution
licensing laws, 35 Florida’s health professional licensing laws, 36 the Florida
Electronic Health Records Exchange Act (“Health Records Act”), 37 the
Florida Information Technology Security Act (“Florida ITS Act”), 38 and the
Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities (“Patient Bill of
Rights”). 39 Florida laws that fall into the second category include the Florida
Information Protection Act (“FIPA”) 40 and Florida common law. 41 This
Article concludes that FIPA, which contains data security and breach
notification standards that will apply to some—but not all—independent
scientists who conduct mobile app mediated research, is the best option for
protecting mobile app mediated research data going forward. 42 This Article
proposes amendments to FIPA that are designed to protect the privacy and
security of all big data subjects, including mobile app mediated health
research participants.43
II.

THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution provides: “Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided
herein.” 44 Although the Florida Supreme Court has stated that the phrase
natural person includes all Floridians, even minors and individuals who are
incompetent, the phrase governmental intrusion makes clear that the Florida
Constitution only protects individuals against governmental—not private—
intrusions. 45 Although mobile app mediated research certainly can be
33.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171; Florida Common Law, WITHOUT MY CONSENT,
http://www.withoutmyconsent.org/50state/state-guides/florida/common-law# (last visited May
1, 2019).
34.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
35.
See FLA. STAT. § 395.001.
36.
See id. § 456.003.
37.
See id. § 408.051.
38.
See id. § 282.318.
39.
See id. § 381.026.
40.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
41.
See Florida Common Law, supra note 33.
42.
Discussion infra Part X; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
43.
Discussion infra Part X; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
44.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
45.
Id.; In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990) (in the
context of a request for the discontinuation of medical treatment with respect to individuals
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conducted by an agent of the Florida—or any other—government, 46 this
Article focuses on private health research conducted or facilitated by mobile
apps such as: Kinsey Reporter; 47 Active Day; 48 Patients Like Me; 49 and My
Fitness Pal. 50 Described in detail in the Author’s prior work, 51 these apps are
neither sponsored, supported, nor affiliated with any governmental agency or
agent thereof. 52 As a result, the Florida Constitution is inapplicable to the
issue on which this Article focuses. 53
Assuming for the moment that the Florida Constitution did apply to
mobile app mediated research conducted by private, independent scientists,
Floridians do have a constitutionally protected interest in their health-related
data. 54 However, neither the Florida Constitution nor its interpretive case
law sets forth particular privacy, security, and breach notification standards
that could help protect that data, or that could minimize the risk of an
who are incompetent); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (in the context of
abortion with respect to minors); Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of
Privacy in Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for
Protection from Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 26 (1997).
“[I]t is critical to recognize that this [constitutional] provision protects only against intrusions
by the government. It does nothing to protect citizens from intrusions by private or
commercial entities. . . . [T]he provision provides no protection from private or commercial
intrusion because the present provision is limited to governmental intrusions.” Overton &
Giddings, supra at 26, 41.
46.
See Peddicord, supra note 8 (“announcing the MyStudies app, a new
mobile technology [designed] to foster the collection of real-world evidence via patients’
mobile devices” for health research and other purposes).
47.
See Clayton A. Davis et al., Kinsey Reporter: Citizen Science for Sex
Research, ARXIV, http://arxiv/org/pdf/1602.04878.pdf (last visited May 1, 2019) (using
Kinsey Reporter, “[c]itizen sex scientists submit reports, each consisting of one or more
surveys, after participating in or observing sexual activity. Surveys cover topics such as
flirting, sexual activity, unwanted experience, consumption of pornography, and hormonal
STORE,
birth
control
side
effects”);
Kinsey
Reporter,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/kinsey-reporter/id533205458?mt=8 (last visited May 1, 2019)
[hereinafter Kinsey Reporter: Apple Store]; Kinsey Reporter, GOOGLE PLAY,
http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kinsey.android&hl=en_us (last visited May
1, 2019) [hereinafter Kinsey Reporter: Google Play].
STORE,
48.
ActiveDay
—
Activity
Study,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/activeday-activity-study/id1183046259?mt=8 (last visited May
1, 2019).
STORE,
49.
PatientsLikeMe,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/patientslikeme/id955272281?mt=8 (last visited May 1, 2019).
STORE,
50.
MyFitnessPal,
APP
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/myfitnesspal/id341232718?mt=8 (last visited May 1, 2019).
51.
Tovino, supra note 6, at 9–14.
52.
See id. at 9–14.
53.
See id.; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
54.
See State v. Tamulonis, 39 So. 3d 524, 528 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
“An individual has a privacy interest in his or her prescription records.” Id.
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unconstitutional intrusion. 55 Florida case law simply makes clear that, in
assessing a claim for an unconstitutional privacy intrusion, a court shall:
[D]etermine whether the individual possesses a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information or subject at issue . . . [i]f
so, the burden shifts to the State to show that . . . there is a
compelling state interest warranting the intrusion into the
individual’s privacy, and . . . that the intrusion is accomplished by
the least intrusive means. 56

The keys to a constitutional inquiry, thus, are a legitimate
expectation of privacy, a compelling state interest, and the means of the
intrusion—not adherence to particular privacy, security, and breach
notification standards. 57
III.

FLORIDA HEALTH INSTITUTION LICENSING LAWS

Although the Florida Constitution does not contain particular
privacy, security, or breach notification standards, a number of other Florida
laws do contain privacy standards applicable to physical and mental health
data of the type collected by mobile health apps and mobile research apps. 58
That said, many of these additional laws only apply to licensed health care
institutions, not independent scientists who, by definition, do not work for or
within any type of institution. 59 For example, Florida’s hospital licensing
law, codified at Chapter 395 of the Florida Statutes, contains privacy
standards applicable to patient records. 60 In particular, Chapter 395 defines a
patient record as a system that includes the following elements: “[B]asic
client data collection; a listing of the patient’s problems; the initial plan with
diagnostic and therapeutic orders as appropriate for each problem identified;
and progress notes, including a discharge summary.” 61 Chapter 395 then
establishes individual rights requirements as well as use and disclosure
requirements—similar to those set forth in the HIPAA Privacy Rule—
55.
See id.; compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23, with Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)) (setting forth particular privacy, security, and
breach notification standards).
56.
Tamulonis, 39 So. 3d at 528.
57.
See id.
58.
FLA. STAT. §§ 395.3015, .3025(4)–(11) (2018); see also FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 23.
59.
FLA. STAT. §§ 395.3015, 395.3025(1).
60.
Id. §§ 395.3015, 395.3025(1).
61.
Id. § 395.3015.
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relating to these records. 62 For example, Chapter 395 gives Florida hospital
patients the right to obtain a copy of their patient records. 63 By further
example, Chapter 395 establishes that hospital patients’ records are
confidential and may not be disclosed without the prior consent of the
patient. 64 However, Chapter 395 also establishes several exceptions to this
prior consent requirement, including when the patient records are needed for
treatment, risk management and quality assurance activities, trauma registry
purposes, organ procurement activities, and epidemiological investigations. 65
Although the data collected and maintained by Florida hospitals in patient
records are similar in type and kind to the data obtained by some independent
scientists through some mobile health and mobile research apps, hospitals are
heavily regulated by the privacy standards referenced in this paragraph but
independent scientists—who, by definition, work independent of an
institution—are not. 66
By further illustrative example, Florida’s nursing home licensing
law, codified within Chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes, establishes certain
nursing home patient rights, including the right of nursing home patients to
privacy in treatment and to confidentiality of personal and medical records. 67
Although the information collected by nursing homes about their residents is
similar in type and kind to that obtained by some independent scientists
using some mobile health research apps,68 nursing homes are required to
comply with a variety of privacy standards set forth in the Florida nursing
62.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 395.3015, and FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(1), with 45
C.F.R. § 164.520 (2018) (establishing the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s individual rights
requirements), and 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018) (establishing the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s use
and disclosure requirements).
63.
FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(1).
64.
Id. § 395.3025(4).
65.
Id. § 395.3025(4)(a), (4)(b), (4)(f), (4)(i), (5).
66.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 395.3015 (defining the content of a patient record
for purposes of the Florida hospital licensing law), with PatientsLikeMe, supra note 49
(collecting information regarding app users’ diagnoses, symptoms, and treatments; charting
users’ daily and monthly symptom progress; disclosing such information to partners of
PatientsLikeMe for research purposes).
67.
FLA. STAT. §§ 400.011, 400.022(1)(m), 400.20.
68.
See Elderly Hip Fracture: Prevention and Treatment, PLACE FOR MOM,
http://www.aplaceformom.com/planning-and-advice/articles/hip-fractures-in-the-elderly (last
visited May 1, 2019) (noting that individuals who are elderly may fall, sustain a hip fracture,
and receive care for that fracture in a nursing home); ActiveDay — Activity Study, supra note
48 (a mobile research app that collects, among other information, information regarding
whether an app user has fallen); FallSafety Pro — Safety Alerts, APP STORE,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/fallsafety-pro-safety-alerts/id870864283?mt=8 (last visited
May 1, 2019) (a mobile occupational safety and health app that collects information regarding
whether a user has fallen, the number of time the user has fallen, and whether a first responder
was called to assist the fallen user).
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home licensing law, whereas independent scientists do not have the same
obligations. 69
As a final illustrative example, Florida’s hospice licensing law, also
codified within Chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes, defines and establishes
uses and disclosure requirements relating to interdisciplinary records of
hospice patients. 70 In particular, the hospice licensing law requires hospices
to maintain an “up-to-date, interdisciplinary record of care being given and
patient and family status. Records shall contain pertinent past and current
medical, nursing, social, and other therapeutic information and such other
information that is necessary for the safe and adequate care of the patient.”71
The hospice licensing law further provides that the interdisciplinary record as
well as related billing records are confidential and may not be disclosed,
although exceptions exist for certain situations, including those involving an
authorization executed by the patient or an order by a court of competent
jurisdiction ordering the release of the interdisciplinary record.72 Although
the information collected by hospices about their terminally ill patients is
similar in type and kind to that obtained by some independent scientists
through some mobile health research apps, hospices are required to comply
with the privacy requirements set forth in Florida’s hospice licensing law,
whereas independent scientists are not. 73
IV.

FLORIDA HEALTH PROFESSIONAL LICENSING LAWS

In addition to health institution licensing laws, a number of
additional Florida laws contain privacy standards applicable to physical and
mental health data of the type collected by mobile health apps and mobile
research apps. 74 However, many of these laws only apply to certain licensed
health care professionals, not non-provider independent scientists whose
69.
See Rothstein et al., supra note 3, at 897, 899; Nursing Home Regulations
—
State
Laws
and
Nursing
Homes,
NURSING HOME ABUSE GUIDE,
http://nursinghomeabuseguide.com/legal-action/nursing-home-regulations/ (last visited May
1, 2019).
70.
FLA. STAT. § 400.611.
71.
Id. § 400.611(1).
72.
Id. § 400.611(3)–(4).
73.
See id. § 400.611(1) (requiring hospice records to “contain pertinent past
and current medical, nursing, social, and other therapeutic information . . . necessary for the
safe and adequate care of [hospice] patient[s],” who, by definition, have a terminal illness);
PLAY,
ALS
Mobilizer
Analyzer,
GOOGLE
http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.prizeforlife.healthcare&hl=en_US
(last
visited May 1, 2019) (a mobile research app used to investigate disease progression in ALS, a
progressive and terminal disease); Nursing Home Regulations — State Laws and Nursing
Homes, supra note 69.
74.
FLA. STAT. §§ 395.3015, 395.3025, 400.011, 400.611, 456.013, 456.059.
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training is in software engineering, information systems, marketing, and
communications. 75 For example, Chapter 456 of the Florida Statutes
establishes general licensing requirements for physicians and other health
care practitioners who practice a health profession in Florida. 76 With respect
to practitioners who are psychiatrists, Chapter 456 specifically states that
“[c]ommunications between a patient and a psychiatrist . . . shall be held
confidential and shall not be disclosed except upon the request of the patient
or the patient’s legal representative.” 77 Chapter 456 further explains,
however, that a psychiatrist may disclose patient communications to the
extent necessary to warn a potential victim or to communicate a threat to a
law enforcement agency when:
(1) A patient is engaged in a treatment relationship with a
psychiatrist; (2) [the] patient has made an actual threat to
physically harm an identifiable victim or victims; and (3) [t]he
treating psychiatrist makes a clinical judgment that the patient has
the apparent capability to commit such an act and that it is more
likely than not that in the near future the patient will carry out that
threat. 78

The general rule requiring psychiatrist confidentiality is designed to
encourage patients with mental health conditions to fully disclose their past
diagnoses and treatments as well as their current “[m]ood, level of anxiety,
thought content, . . . and perception and cognition” to enable the psychiatrist
to accurately diagnose and treat the patient. 79 The general rule, combined
with the three exceptions, is also designed to remind the psychiatrist that
each patient’s history, physical, and other information must be maintained in
confidence and is not to be disclosed except in discrete situations in which

75.
See About Us, FALLSAFETY, http://www.fallsafetyapp.com/about-us (last
visited May 1, 2019) (noting that the FallSafety employees responsible for developing several
occupational safety and health mobile apps, including the FallSafety Pro, Lone Worker Pro,
and Worker Safety Pro apps, include “safety-oriented engineers, keen-eyed designers,
disciplined quality assurance people, passionate marketers and business development
professionals, advanced researchers and technology innovators,” but not licensed health care
professionals).
76.
FLA. STAT. § 456.013.
77.
Id. § 456.059.
78.
Id.
79.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATION OF ADULTS 6, 9 (3d ed. 2015) (stating as a guideline that a psychiatrist should
obtain this information during an initial psychiatric evaluation of a patient; further stating,
“[t]he goal of this guideline is to improve the quality of the doctor-patient relationship, the
accuracy of psychiatric diagnoses, and the appropriateness of treatment selection.”).
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the public interest outweighs the patient’s right to confidentiality. 80
Interestingly, the information obtained by psychiatrists—including
information regarding past diagnoses and treatments as well as current mood,
level of anxiety, and thought content—is very similar to the information
obtained by a number of mobile health apps and mobile research apps.81
Although Florida psychiatrists are heavily regulated by privacy standards set
forth in Chapter 456 of the Florida Statutes, non-provider independent
scientists who conduct mobile app mediated research are not. 82
By further illustrative example, Chapter 490 of the Florida Statutes
establishes licensure requirements for clinical psychologists who practice in
Florida. 83 In the legislative intent section of Chapter 490, the Florida
Legislature explains that:
[A]s society becomes increasingly complex, emotional survival is
equal in importance to physical survival. Therefore, in order to
preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the public, the
Legislature must provide privileged communication for members
of the public or those acting on their behalf to encourage needed or
desired psychological services to be sought out. 84

To this end, Chapter 490 establishes a general rule that, “[a]ny
communication[s] between [a psychologist] and her or his patient or client
80.
See FLA. STAT. § 456.059.
81.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 79, at 5, 6; compare Parmet,
supra note 8 (explaining that the mobile research app BiAffect “unobtrusively monitors
keyboard dynamics metadata, such as typing speed and rhythm, mistakes in texts, and the use
of backspace and auto-correct [and that such data is then] analyzed using an artificial
intelligence-based machine learning approach to identify digital biomarkers of manic and
depressive episodes in people with bipolar disorder”), with Olwen Glynn Owen, Bipolar
Disorder: Psychiatrists Are Taking a New Approach that Aims to Treat Not Just Symptoms
NEWS
TODAY
(July
18,
2007),
but
the
Whole
Person,
MED.
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/77227.php (discussing the traditional treatment of
patients with bipolar disorder by psychiatrists); compare Featured Conditions at
PatientsLikeMe, PATIENTSLIKEME: CONDITIONS, http://www.patientslikeme.com/conditions
(last visited May 1, 2019) (noting that the PatientsLikeMe mobile app collects symptom data
from patients who have a number of mental and behavioral health conditions, including drug
addiction and alcohol addiction), with PSYCHOL. TODAY: YAHYA SAEED (Feb. 15, 2019),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/us/psychiatrists/yahya-saeed-houstontx/391190?sid=1545765952.5073_17507&city=San+Antonio&state=TX&spec=248&ref=1&t
r=ResultsName (profiling a traditional psychiatrist who treats patients and collects
information regarding patients with alcohol and drug addiction).
82.
See FLA. STAT. § 456.059; Who Regulates All These Health-Related
Apps?, HEALTHLINE, http://www.healthline.com/health-news/who-regulates-all-these-healthrelated-apps#1 (last visited May 1, 2019).
83.
FLA. STAT. §§ 490.005–.006.
84.
Id. § 490.002.
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shall be confidential.” 85 Chapter 490 allows the privilege to be waived in
only three situations:
(1) When the [psychologist] is a . . . defendant [in a legal] action
arising from a complaint filed by the patient, . . . in which case the
waiver [is] limited to that [legal] action; (2) [w]hen the patient . . .
agrees to the waiver, in writing, or when more than one person in a
family is receiving therapy, when each family member agrees to
the waiver, in writing; [or] (3) [w]hen there is a clear and
immediate probability of physical harm to the patient or client, to
other individuals, or to society and the [psychologist]
communicates the information only to the potential victim,
appropriate family member, or law enforcement or other
appropriate authorities. 86

Although psychologists may obtain information that is similar in
type and kind to that obtained by non-psychologist independent scientists
through a mobile health or health research app, psychologists are heavily
regulated by the privacy standards referenced in this section whereas
independent scientists are not. 87
Similarly, Chapter 490 and 491 of the Florida Statutes establishes
licensure requirements for psychotherapists, clinical social workers, marriage
and family therapists, and mental health counselors. 88 In the legislative
intent section of Chapter 491, the Florida Legislature explains that:
[A]s society becomes increasingly complex, emotional survival is
equal in importance to physical survival. Therefore, in order to
preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the public, the
Legislature must provide privileged communication for members
of the public or those acting on their behalf to encourage needed
or desired counseling, clinical and psychotherapy services, or
certain other services of a psychological nature to be sought out. 89

85.
Id. § 490.0147.
86.
Id.
87.
See id.; compare Parmet, supra note 8 (explaining that the mobile research
app BiAffect “unobtrusively monitors keyboard dynamics metadata, such as typing speed and
rhythm, mistakes in texts, and the use of backspace and auto-correct [and that such data is
then] analyzed using an artificial intelligence-based machine learning approach to identify
digital biomarkers of manic and depressive episodes in people with bipolar disorder”), with
Culbertson v. Culbertson, 455 S.W.3d 107, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing a child
custody case involving a father with bipolar disorder and legal questions relating to waiver of
the psychologist-patient privilege).
88.
FLA. STAT. §§ 490.0051, 491.0046.
89.
Id. § 491.002.
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To this end, Chapter 491 provides that, “[a]ny communication
between [a mental health counselor] and her or his patient or client shall be
confidential.” 90 Chapter 491 permits waiver of this secrecy only:
(1) When the [mental health counselor] is a party defendant to a
[legal] action arising from a complaint filed by the patient . . . in
which case the waiver [is] limited to that [legal] action; (2) [w]hen
the patient . . . agrees to the waiver in writing; or . . . (3) [w]hen, in
the clinical judgment of the [mental health counselor], there is a
clear and immediate probability of physical harm to the patient or
client, to other individuals, or to society and the [mental health
counselor] communicates the information only to the potential
victim, appropriate family member, or law enforcement or other
appropriate authorities. 91

Although Florida’s mental health counselors may obtain information
that is similar in type and kind to that obtained by non-counselor independent
scientists through a mobile health or mobile research app, mental health
counselors are heavily regulated by the privacy standards set forth in this
section whereas independent scientists are not. 92
The examples above involve psychiatrists, psychologists, and mental
health counselors. 93 As background for this initial focus, many mobile
health apps are specifically designed to help individuals with their mental
health. 94 However, non-mental health practitioners also are required to
adhere to privacy standards set forth in Florida law. 95 Again, however, these
standards apply only to health care practitioners, not non-practitioner
independent scientists. 96 For example, one provision within Chapter 456 of
the Florida Statutes regulates a records owner, defined as:

90.
Id. § 491.0147.
91.
Id.
92.
See id. §§ 491.0147, 491.002; Independent Scientists: Young Researchers
Producing
Remarkable
Research,
MANA,
http://www.nims.go.Jp/mana/about/independent.html (last visited May 1, 2019); compare
Pooja Chandrashekar, Do Mental Health Mobile Apps Work: Evidence and Recommendations
for Designing High-Efficacy Mental Health Mobile Apps, MHEALTH, Mar. 23, 2018, at 1, 3
(noting that mobile mental health apps “enable users to self-monitor their mood by
periodically reporting their thoughts, behaviors, and actions”), with Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.
2d 348, 357 (Fla. 2002) (noting that the defendant psychotherapist obtained—and then shared
without consent—confidential mental health information).
93.
FLA. STAT. §§ 456.059, 490.0051, 490.0147, 491.0046.
94.
Terry & Gunter, supra note 7, at 136 (discussing mobile mental health
apps).
95.
FLA. STAT. § 456.057.
96.
Id. § 456.057(1).
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[A]ny health care practitioner who generates a medical record after
making a physical or mental examination of, or administering
treatment or dispensing legend drugs to, any person; any health
care practitioner to whom records are transferred by a previous
records owner; [and] any health care practitioner’s employer,
including, but not limited to, group practices and staff-model
health maintenance organizations, provided the employment
contract or agreement between the employer and the health care
practitioner designates the employer as the records owner. 97

This provision then requires health care practitioners and records
owners to give “copies of all reports and records relating to [their]
examination [and] treatment” to patients upon request. 98 This provision also
prohibits the furnishing of such records, or the discussion of a patient’s
medical condition, with any person other than the patient, without patient
authorization, unless an exception applies. 99 To the extent an individual
conducting mobile app mediated health research is a non-practitioner
scientist, software engineer, or other businessperson, the provisions
discussed in this paragraph will not apply. 100 Again, these privacy standards
are limited in application to health care practitioners. 101
V.

THE HEALTH RECORDS ACT

In addition to Florida laws that impose privacy requirements on
health care institutions and health care professionals as a condition of
licensure, additional Florida laws seek to regulate the electronic exchange of
health records. 102 However, these laws also only apply to licensed health
care professionals, not to non-provider independent scientists. 103 For
example, the Health Records Act, codified in Chapter 408 of the Florida
Statutes, required the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration to
develop, by the year 2010, a universal patient authorization form that “may
be used by a health care provider to document patient authorization for the
use or [disclosure] of an identifiable health record.” 104 As background, the
Health Records Act defines health record as “any information, recorded in
any form or medium, which relates to the past, present, or future health of an
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. § 456.057(6).
Id. § 456.057(7)(a).
See FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a).
Id.
See id. § 408.051.
Id.
Id. § 408.051(4)(a).
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individual for the primary purpose of providing health care and healthrelated services.” 105 The Health Records Act further defines identifiable
health record as “any health record that identifies the patient or with respect
to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to
identify the patient.” 106
Pursuant to the terms of the Health Records Act, “[a] health care
provider receiving [a universal] authorization form containing a request for
the release of an identifiable health record [is required to] accept the form as
a valid authorization to release an identifiable health record.” 107 In addition,
“[t]he exchange by a health care provider of an identifiable health record
upon receipt of an authorization form completed and submitted in
accordance with [the Health Records Act] creates a rebuttable presumption
that the release of the identifiable health record was appropriate.” 108
Moreover, “[a] health care provider that exchanges an identifiable health
record upon receipt of an authorization form [is] deemed to have [not]
violated or waived any privilege protected under [Florida law].” 109 Finally,
the Health Records Act specifies that the release of an identifiable health
record of a patient without the patient’s authorization is permitted for “the
treatment of the patient for an emergency medical condition.”110
Although the health data collected by a mobile research app could
easily fit within the definition of a health record, the privacy standards set
forth within the Health Records Act only apply to health care providers, not
non-provider scientists. 111 Stated another way, the Health Records Act’s
universal authorization form provisions have no application to the context of
mobile app mediated health research conducted by independent scientists.112
VI.

FLORIDA ITS ACT

Although many of the laws discussed above are limited in
application to health industry participants, Florida has a number of additional
laws that establish security standards that, in theory, could help protect
physical and mental health data of the type collected by independent
scientists who use mobile health apps and mobile research apps. 113 For
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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example, the Florida ITS Act requires the Florida Agency for State
Technology (“Agency”) to establish “standards and processes consistent with
generally accepted best practices for information technology security, to
include cybersecurity, and [to] adopt[] rules that safeguard an agency’s data,
information, and information technology resources to ensure availability,
confidentiality, and integrity and to mitigate risks.” 114
In particular, the Florida ITS Act requires the Agency to:
(a) Develop, and annually update . . . a statewide
information technology security strategic plan that includes
security goals and objectives for the strategic issues of information
technology security policy, risk management, training, incident
management, and disaster recovery planning.
(b) Develop, and publish for use . . . an information
technology security framework that, at a minimum, includes
guidelines and processes for:
(1) Establishing asset management procedures to ensure
that an agency’s information technology resources are identified
and managed consistent with their relative importance to the
agency’s business objectives.
(2) Using a standard risk assessment methodology that
includes the identification of an agency’s priorities, constraints,
risk tolerances, and assumptions necessary to support operational
risk decisions.
(3) Completing comprehensive risk assessments and
information technology security audits . . . .
(4) Identifying protection procedures to manage the
protection of an agency’s information, data, and information
technology resources.
(5) Establishing procedures for accessing information and
data to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of such
information and data.
(6) Detecting threats through proactive monitoring of
events, continuous security monitoring, and defined detection
processes.
(7) Establishing agency computer security incident
response teams and describing their responsibilities for responding
to information technology security incidents, including breaches of
personal information containing confidential or exempt data.
(8) Recovering information and data in response to an
information technology security incident . . . .
(9) Establishing an information technology security
incident reporting process . . . .
114.

Id. § 282.318(1), (3).
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(10) Incorporating information obtained through detection
and response activities into the agency’s information technology
security incident response plans.
(11) Developing agency strategic and operational
information technology security plans . . . .
(12) Establishing the managerial, operational, and
technical safeguards for protecting state government data and
information technology resources . . . . 115

The Florida ITS Act thus establishes comprehensive security
standards similar to those set forth in the HIPAA Security Rule.116 The catch
is that only state agencies, defined as any “official, officer, commission,
board, authority, council, committee, or department of the executive branch
of [Florida] state government; the Justice Administrative Commission; and
the Public Service Commission” are required to comply with these security
standards. 117 By definition, independent scientists do not work for a state
agency. 118 As a result, the Florida ITS Act has no application to the instant
issue. 119
VII.

FIPA

Florida still has other laws that contain security standards, as well as
breach notification standards that could, in theory, help protect physical and
mental health data of the type collected by mobile health apps and mobile
research apps. 120 For example, FIPA—codified within Chapter 501 of the
Florida Statutes—applies to a covered entity, defined to include “a sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative,
association, . . . commercial entity, [or governmental entity] that acquires,
maintains, stores, or uses personal information;” as well as a third-party
agent, defined as “an entity that has been contracted to maintain, store, or
process personal information on behalf of a covered entity or governmental
entity.” 121 Because an independent scientist could be a sole proprietor, or an
independent scientist could form a commercial entity with other business,
marketing, and communication professionals, FIPA has potential application

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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FLA. STAT. § 282.318(3)(a), (b)(1)–(12).
Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.308 (2018).
FLA. STAT. § 282.0041(23).
See Lovelock, supra note 10.
See FLA. STAT. § 282.318(2)–(3).
See id. § 501.171.
Id. § 501.171(1)(b), (h).
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to independent scientists, and/or their commercial entities, that develop
and/or use mobile apps to conduct health research. 122
The application of FIPA hinges, however, on whether the covered
entity “acquires, maintains, stores, or uses personal information.” 123 FIPA
defines personal information as:
(1) An individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following data elements
for that individual: [a] social security number; [b] . . . driver[’s]
license or identification card number, passport number, military
identification number, or other similar number issued on a
government document used to verify identity; [c] . . . financial
account number or credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that is
necessary to permit access to an individual’s financial account; [d]
. . . information regarding an individual’s medical history, mental
or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a
health care professional; or [e] [a]n individual’s health insurance
policy number or subscriber identification number and any unique
identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual; or (2)
[a] user name or e-mail address, in combination with a password
or security question and answer that would permit access to an
online account. 124

Some mobile research apps require the user to enter: (1) the user’s
first and last name; and (2) a user name or email address combined with a
password or security question. 125 To the extent the user also provides the
app with “information regarding [the] individual’s medical history, mental or
physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care
professional,” FIPA’s security and breach notification standards, discussed
below, would apply. 126 However, other mobile research apps allow research
participants to supply health information without providing: (1) a first and
last name; or (2) a user name or email address combined with a password or
122.
See id.; Tovino, supra note 6, at 40; About Us, supra note 75 (referencing
the commercial entity Fall Safety, which employs software engineers as well as marketing and
communications professionals to develop occupational safety and health apps as well as
occupational safety and health research apps).
123.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
124.
Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(1).
125.
See
Privacy
Policy,
PATIENTSLIKEME,
http://www.patientslikeme.com/about/privacy (last visited May 1, 2019). PatientsLikeMe is a
mobile health app that requires the user to enter an email address, a user name, and a password
before the user may enter health information. Id.; PatientsLikeMe, supra note 49.
126.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(IV); What Is PII?, U. MASS. MED. SCH.,
http://www.umassmed.edu/it/security/compliance/what-is-pii/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
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security question. 127 In the case of these latter mobile research apps, FIPA’s
security and breach notification standards would not apply. 128
To the extent FIPA applies, the law requires “[e]ach covered entity,
governmental entity, or third-party agent [to] take reasonable measures to
protect and secure data in electronic form containing personal
information.” 129 This provision may be referred to as a modest reasonable
security standard. 130 FIPA also requires “[e]ach covered entity [and] thirdparty agent [to] take all reasonable measures to dispose, or arrange for the
disposal, of customer records containing personal information within [their]
custody or control when the records are no longer to be retained.” 131 “Such
disposal shall involve shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying the
personal information in the records to make it unreadable or undecipherable
through any means.” 132 These latter two provisions may be referred to as
modest secure disposal standards. 133 These provisions are modest because
they pale in comparison to the comprehensive security standards set forth in
the HIPAA Security Rule, 134 as well as other state laws, including the Florida
ITS Act. 135

127.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1); see also Frequently Asked Questions,
KINSEY REP., http://www.kinseyreporter.org/#/faq (last updated May 1, 2019). Kinsey
Reporter is a mobile sexual health research app that allows users to donate sexual health data,
such as female hormonal birth control effects, for research purposes without the users
identifying themselves or providing a user name or email address. Frequently Asked
Questions, supra.
128.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
129.
Id. § 501.171 (2).
130.
Id.; Kevin L. Miller, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Reasonable Cybersecurity: A Proactive and Adaptive Approach, FLA. B.J., Sept./Oct. 2016, at
23, 26.
131.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(8). Florida Statute § 501.171(1)(c) defines a
customer record as:
[A]ny material, regardless of the physical form, on which personal information is
recorded or preserved by any means, including, but not limited to, written or spoken
words, graphically depicted, printed, or electromagnetically transmitted that are
provided by an individual in [Florida] to a covered entity for the purpose of
purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service.

Id. § 501.171(1)(c).
132.
Id. § 501.171(8).
133.
See Charles H. Kennedy, Secure Records Disposal: Is Not Shedding Ever
MOUNTAIN,
a
Good
Idea?,
IRON
http://www.ironmountain.com/resources/whitepapers/s/secure-records-disposal-is-notshredding-ever-a-good-idea (last visited May 1, 2019).
134.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191 § 201, 110 Stat. 1936, 1992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012));
FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318(3), 501.171(2), (4), (8).
135.
See FLA. STAT. § 282.318.
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In addition to these modest security standards, FIPA contains
comprehensive breach notification provisions. 136 In particular, FIPA
requires a covered entity to give notice to each individual in the state of
Florida whose personal information was, or the covered entity reasonably
believes to have been, accessed as a result of a breach of security, defined as
“unauthorized access of data in electronic form containing personal
information.” 137 FIPA requires the notice to be made “as expeditiously as
practicable and without unreasonable delay, taking into account the time
necessary to allow the covered entity to determine the scope of the breach of
security, to identify individuals affected by the breach, and to restore the
reasonable integrity of the data system that was breached;” however, the
notice may not be made later than thirty days after the determination of a
breach or reason to believe a breach occurred. 138 When required, notice to an
individual shall include, at a minimum:
(1) [t]he date, estimated date, or estimated date range of the breach
of security; (2) [a] description of the personal information that was
accessed or reasonably believed to have been accessed as a part of
the breach of security; (3) [i]nformation that the individual can use
to contact the covered entity to inquire about the breach of security
and the personal information that the covered entity maintained
about the individual. 139

In addition to notifying the individual who was the subject of the
information breach, FIPA also requires the covered entity to provide notice
to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs (“Department”) of any breach of
security affecting five hundred or more individuals in the state of Florida. 140
The covered entity must provide this notice to the Department as
expeditiously as practicable, but not later than thirty days after the
determination of the breach or reason to believe a breach has occurred.141 A
covered entity may, however, receive fifteen additional days if the covered
entity provides the Department, in writing, good cause for delay within thirty
days after determination of the breach or reason to believe a breach has
occurred. 142 FIPA requires written notice to the Department to include:

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. § 501.171(4).
Id. § 501.171(1)(a), (4)(a).
Id. § 501.171(4)(a).
Id. § 501.171(4)(e).
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(3)(a).
Id. § 501.171(3)(a).
Id.
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(1) [a] synopsis of the events surrounding the breach at the time
notice is provided; (2) [t]he number of individuals in [Florida] who
were, or potentially have been affected by the breach; (3) [a]ny
services related to the breach being offered or scheduled to be
offered, without charge, by the covered entity to individuals, and
instructions as to how to use such services; (4) [a] copy of the
notice . . . ; (5) [t]he name, address, telephone number, and e-mail
address of the employee or agent of the covered entity from whom
additional information may be obtained about the breach. 143

“If a covered entity discovers circumstances requiring notice . . . of
more than [one thousand] individuals at a single time,” FIPA also requires
the covered entity to “notify, without unreasonable delay, all consumer
reporting agencies that compile and maintain files on consumers on a
nationwide basis, . . . of the timing, distribution, and content of the
notices.” 144
Interestingly, FIPA provides that:
Notice provided pursuant to rules, regulations,
procedures, or guidelines established by the covered entity’s
primary or functional federal regulator is deemed to be in
compliance with [FIPA’s] notice requirement . . . if the covered
entity notifies affected individuals in accordance with the rules,
regulations, procedures, or guidelines established by the primary
or functional federal regulator in the event of a breach of
security. 145

As discussed in the Author’s prior work and above in this Article,
most independent scientists do not have a primary or functional federal
regulator. 146 Thus, FIPA, to the extent applicable, may be the primary—or
actually only—form of regulation. 147
FIPA provides that a violation of its reasonable security, secure
disposal, or breach notification provisions “shall be treated as an unfair or
deceptive trade practice” for which the Department may bring a legal
action. 148 A covered entity that fails to notify affected individuals and the
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. § 501.171(3)(b).
Id. § 501.171(5).
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4)(g).
Stacey A. Tovino, Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach, 15
ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 242, 242 (2008); see also discussion supra Parts I–VI (discussing the
lack of application of many Florida laws to independent scientists who conduct mobile app
mediated research).
147.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171.
148.
Id. § 501.171(9)(a).
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Department in accordance with FIPA’s breach notification requirements
shall also be liable for: (1) during the first thirty days following the
violation, a civil penalty of $1,000 per day; (2) for each subsequent thirtyday period or portion thereof through the 180th day following the violation, a
civil penalty of $50,000; and (3) after the 180th day following the violation,
a civil penalty up to $500,000. 149 FIPA clarifies that these civil penalties
apply per breach, not “per individual affected by the breach.” 150 Notably,
FIPA “does not establish a private cause of action.” 151
VIII.

PATIENT BILL OF RIGHTS

None of the Florida laws discussed above have specific or express
application to researchers. 152 However, the Patient Bill of Rights, codified in
Chapter 381 of the Florida Statutes, provides that “a patient has the right to
know if medical treatment is for purposes of experimental research and to
consent prior to participation in such experimental research.” 153 The Patient
Bill of Rights further provides that, “[f]or any patient, regardless of ability to
pay or source of payment for his or her care, participation must be a
voluntary matter; and a patient has the right to refuse to participate. The
patient’s consent or refusal must be documented in the patient’s care
record.” 154 If applicable to mobile app mediated research, these provisions
create some privacy protections for research participants; that is, they
prohibit the collection of an individual’s information by an app for research
purposes without the individual’s prior consent. 155 Nothing in the quoted
language set forth in this paragraph limits the application of this privacy
prohibition to just health care providers or health care facilities. 156 That said,
the stated intent of the Patient Bill of Rights is to protect “patients of health
care providers and health care facilities.” 157 In addition, the prefatory
statement in the beginning of the Patient Bill of Rights suggests that the
enumerated obligations only apply to health care providers and health care

149.
Id. § 501.171(9)(b).
150.
Id. § 501.171(9)(b)(2).
151.
Id. § 501.171(10).
152.
See discussion supra Parts I–VII.
153.
FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4)(e).
154.
Id.
155.
See id.
156.
See id.
157.
Id. at § 381.026(3). “It is the purpose of this section to promote the
interests and well-being of the patients of health care providers and health care facilities and to
promote better communication between the patient and the health care provider.” FLA. STAT.
§ 381.026(3).
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facilities. 158 As such, these privacy protections probably would not apply to
a non-provider independent scientist, who does not work within or for a
Florida-licensed health care facility. 159
IX.

FLORIDA COMMON LAW

Florida recognizes a number of common law causes of action that
involve duties relevant to confidentiality and privacy. 160 For example,
Florida recognizes a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty when a
fiduciary impermissibly discloses a confidence. 161 Under Florida law, the
elements of the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty include: (1) the
existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) a breach of such duty; (3) proximate
causation; and (4) damages. 162 The first element, which is the crucial
element for the issue at hand, requires an actor to have a fiduciary
relationship with the person who is claiming damages. 163 Fiduciary duties
have been recognized in cases involving an attorney/client, executor/heir,
guardian/ward,
agent/principal,
trustee/beneficiary,
corporate
officer/shareholder, psychiatrist/patient, psychotherapist/patient, mental
health counselor/patient, and other similar relationships where great trust is
imposed on one person for the benefit of another. 164 Some courts, however,
have imposed fiduciary duties on other, less-classic actors, including lenders,
clerics, and wives. 165 The question in the instant case is whether a court
would impose a fiduciary duty on an independent scientist who conducts
mobile app mediated research and, to a lesser extent, whether that scientist
could breach that duty in a case involving a privacy or security breach of
confidential research data. 166

158.
Id. § 381.026(4). “Each health care facility or provider shall . . . .” Id.
159.
See id.
160.
See Florida Common Law, supra note 33.
161.
Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002).
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
John F. Mariani et al., Understanding Fiduciary Duty, FLA. B.J., March
2010, at 21, 21; see also Gracey, 837 So. 2d at 353; DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d
1128, 1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Barnett Bank of Marion Cty. v. Shirey, 655 So. 2d
1156, 1158 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Cohen v. Hattaway, 595 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986); Eckhardt v.
Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc., 953 P.2d 722, 727–28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
165.
Mariani et al., supra note 164, at 21 (providing an outstanding overview
of Florida law governing the fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duties).
166.
See Suthers v. Amgen Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 (S.D.
Fla. 2003); Tovino, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing the application of fiduciary duties in the
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As the Author explained in a prior work, “fiduciary relationships
may be expressly or impliedly created.” 167 Because it is unlikely that an
independent scientist who conducts mobile app mediated research would
expressly identify as a fiduciary in any electronic or other policies related to
the mobile app, the concept of an implied fiduciary relationship is
discussed. 168 “Implied fiduciary relationships are premised on the specific
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and the relationship of
the parties. These relationships have been found when confidence is reposed
by one individual, the principal, and trust is accepted by the other individual,
the fiduciary.” 169 Although research participants have sought to impose
fiduciary duties on researchers, these attempts are usually unsuccessful. 170
As the Author explained elsewhere:
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 171 a patient,
Moore, who underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia, and
whose treating physician used the patient’s cells to establish and
patent a new cell line without his permission, sued the physician,
Dr. Golde, the Regents of the University of California (“Regents”),
a researcher employed by the Regents, Quan, and other parties for
breach of fiduciary duty and twelve additional causes of action . . .
The California Supreme Court applied the fiduciary duty to Dr.
Golde, but summarily dismissed the breach of fiduciary cause of
action with respect to the other defendants: “The Regents, Quan
[and others] are not physicians. In contrast to [Dr.] Golde, none of
these defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship with Moore or
had the duty to obtain Moore’s informed consent to medical
procedures.”
Other courts have dismissed breach-of-fiduciary-duty
causes of action when the research participant failed to present
sufficient evidence of the formation of the fiduciary relationship.
In Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, 172
the plaintiffs sued a researcher, hospital, and research institute for
breach of fiduciary duty based on the defendants’ alleged failure to
disclose material information relating to their disease research.
When the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege any
context of researchers who conduct neuroimaging studies and who may discover incidental
neurological findings).
167.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 250; see also Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1071.
168.
See Suthers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429; Tovino, supra note 146, at 250.
169.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 250; see also Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1071.
170.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 251.
171.
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
172.
264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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facts showing that the defendants had recognized or accepted the
trust, as required to form the fiduciary relationship, the plaintiffs
responded by alleging that the defendants impliedly accepted the
trust by undertaking research that they represented as being for the
benefit of the plaintiffs. The court disagreed, reasoning that the
plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged the second element of a
fiduciary relationship—acceptance of trust by the researchers—
and that this element cannot be assumed from the subjects’
research participation:
“There is no automatic fiduciary
relationship that attaches when a researcher accepts medical
donations and the acceptance of trust, the second constitutive
element of finding a fiduciary duty, cannot be assumed once a
donation is given.”
Other courts also have considered, at least in dicta, the
question of whether researchers owe their participants fiduciary
duties. Suthers v. [Amgen Inc.], 173 involved an investigation of an
experimental Parkinson’s treatment—glial-derived neurotrophic
factor (“GDNF”)—at several sites, including New York University
(“NYU”). Amgen, the trial sponsor, discontinued the trials after
data indicated that GDNF was neither safe nor effective. Two of
the research participants who received GDNF in an extended
version of the study conducted at NYU sued Amgen to compel the
provision of GDNF, which the participants believed relieved their
Parkinson’s symptoms. One of their causes of action was breach
of fiduciary duty, which the court refused to impose on Amgen:
“[T]here is no basis in fact or law to impose a fiduciary duty
running from the sponsor of an independent study to participants
who it does not select, has not met, and about whom it may not
know the details of their medical conditions.” Because the
participants did not name NYU or its researchers as defendants,
the court did not address the applicability of the fiduciary duty to
the research team, although the court noted in dicta one
bioethicist’s criticism of the application of fiduciary duties to
researchers.
Notwithstanding these cases, the nature of the relationship
between researchers and participants continues to be debated.
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that researchers are fiduciaries visà-vis their participants. Attorney Alan Milstein, who successfully
represented University of Pennsylvania gene therapy participant,
and decedent, Jesse Gelsinger, recently stated [that once a research
participant] signs . . . [an] informed consent [to research document,
the fiduciary relationship has been established].
....

173.
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Other attorneys and scholars take a middle ground and
admit that there are important distinctions between the researcher–
participant relationship and the types of relationships traditionally
governed by fiduciary principles, although they use the concept of
the fiduciary relationship as a framework for thinking about the
researcher–participant relationship. Finally, some attorneys and
scholars expressly oppose the application of fiduciary duties to
researchers, reasoning that the relationship between researcher and
participant differs fundamentally from that between physician and
patient, that clinical research should not be conflated with medical
care, and that the purpose of research is not to benefit
individuals. 174

In summary, it is certainly possible for a mobile app mediated
research participant to claim that an independent scientist has a fiduciary
duty that favorably runs towards the research participant. 175 However, it is
unlikely that a court would agree absent an express assumption of trust by
the independent scientist or other facts not contemplated by this Article. 176
Even if an independent scientist were found by a court to have a fiduciary
relationship with the scientist’s research participants, the case law discussed
above does not establish privacy, security, or breach notification standards
compliance with which would establish proper fiduciary behavior. 177
In addition to breach of fiduciary duty based on breach of trust or
confidence, Florida also recognizes four invasion of privacy torts, including:
(1) appropriation, [which is] the unauthorized use of a person’s
name or likeness to obtain some benefit; (2) intrusion, [which is
the] physical[] or electronic[] intru[sion] into one’s private
quarters; (3) public disclosure of private facts, [which] is the
dissemination of truthful private information [that] a reasonable
person would find objectionable; and (4) false light in the public
eye, [which is the] publication of facts [that] place a person in a
false light even though the facts themselves may not be
defamatory. 178

174.
Tovino, supra note 146, at 251–53 (citations omitted) (first quoting
Moore, 793 P.2d at 486; then quoting Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; then quoting
Suthers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429).
175.
See id.
176.
Id. at 254.
177.
Id.; see Suthers, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 429; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1072.
178.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003) (listing the
four invasion of privacy torts recognized in Florida).
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“All of these actions are tied together by the common thread of
privacy, but otherwise they have little in common.” 179 Absent extraordinary
facts not contemplated by this Article, the first and the last torts—
appropriation and false light—have little application to the issue at hand. 180
Appropriation would require, for example, the independent scientist—or,
perhaps, a person who received personal data from the independent
scientist—to use the research participant’s name, image, or other comparable
research data for commercial or other advantage without the research
participant’s prior authorization. 181
False light would require the
independent scientist—or, perhaps, a person who received personal data
from the independent scientist—to publish in a widespread manner facts that
place the research participant in a highly offensive, false light. 182 Although
one could certainly create a fact pattern involving an independent scientist
and mobile research participant that satisfies the elements of one or both
torts, such a fact pattern is unlikely. 183
The second tort—intrusion—has still unlikely but potential
application to the issue at hand. 184 “Intrusion involves ‘the unreasonable and
highly offensive intrusion upon the seclusion of another.’” 185 Examples of
intrusion found to be actionable include “the illegal diversion or interception
and opening of one’s mail, peeping into one’s home, the viewing of a
department store’s changing room by someone of the opposite sex where no
adequate notice has been provided, persistent and unwanted telephone calls,
wiretapping, or prying into a plaintiff’s bank account.” 186 An independent
scientist who obtains personal data from a research participant’s mobile
phone and uses that data for research purposes without providing prior notice
to, and without obtaining the authorization of, the research participant could
arguably be a proper defendant in an intrusion case. 187 On the other hand, an
independent scientist whose mobile app—through an electronic privacy
policy or otherwise—notifies the potential research participant of the types
of data that will be collected for research purposes and who obtains the
individual’s prior and express electronic authorization to such research
participation should be able to defeat an intrusion claim. 188
179.
Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 41.
180.
See id. at 41–43.
181.
See id. at 41 (explaining the appropriation tort under Florida law).
182.
See id. at 43 (explaining the false light tort under Florida law).
183.
See id. at 41–43.
184.
Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 42.
185.
Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 117, at 854 (5th ed. 1984)) (explaining the intrusion tort under Florida law).
186.
Id.
187.
See id.
188.
See id.; Moore et al., supra note 1, 3–4.
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The third tort—public disclosure of private facts—also has unlikely
but potential application to the issue at hand. 189 In a case based on public
disclosure of private facts, “[t]he plaintiff must allege that facts were made
public that would normally [be] kept hidden from the public eye. Moreover,
the facts disclosed must be facts that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” 190 One can imagine that an independent scientist who
made public highly offensive facts collected during research—perhaps
sexual behavior or sexual disease information 191—might be named as a
defendant in a public disclosure of private facts case if the scientist had
promised the research participant confidentiality. 192
The case law
interpreting both the second and third torts does not contain particular
privacy, security, or breach notification standards, compliance with which
would defeat the torts. 193 That said, the privacy concepts of prior notification
and prior authorization are referenced in the case law and, if adequately pled
by the independent scientist, should be sufficient to defeat a claim. 194
X.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

This Article has carefully examined a variety of provisions within
Florida law to determine whether Florida law contains comprehensive
privacy, security, and breach notification standards that could apply to
independent scientists who conduct mobile app mediated health research. 195
This Article has concluded that Florida law tends to fall into one of two
categories—that is: (1) the law contains at least one data privacy, security,
and/or breach notification right or standard, but the right or standard is
limited in application to certain actors, certain professions, or certain
institutions and does not apply to independent scientists; or (2) the law is not
necessarily limited in application but the law fails to establish comprehensive
privacy, security, and breach notification standards that will drive the
implementation of privacy and security best practices by independent
scientists. 196 Florida laws that fall into the first category include the Florida

law).

189.
190.

Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 42.
Id. (discussing the public disclosure of private facts tort under Florida

191.
See id.; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127.
192.
See Overton & Giddings, supra note 45, at 40–42.
193.
Id. at 42; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 160–62 (Fla.
2003); Doe v. Univision Television Grp., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
194.
See Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d at 160–62; Doe, 717 So. 2d at 64.
195.
See discussion supra Parts II–IX.
196.
Discussion supra Parts II–IX; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; FLA. STAT.
§§ 282.318, 381.026, 395.0197, 408.051, 464.0095, 501.171 (2018); Florida Common Law,
supra note 33.
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Constitution (privacy), Florida’s health institution licensing laws (privacy),
Florida’s health professional licensing laws (privacy), the Health Records
Act (privacy), Florida ITS Act (security), and the Patient Bill of Rights
(privacy). 197 Florida laws that fall into the second category include FIPA
(security and breach notification) and Florida common law (privacy). 198
FIPA, which contains security and breach notification standards that
will apply to some, but not all, independent scientists who conduct mobile
app mediated research studies may be the best option for protecting mobile
app mediated research data going forward. 199 Several amendments to FIPA
would be necessary, however, to make the law apply to all independent
scientists who conduct mobile app mediated research. 200 First, as currently
written, FIPA applies to a covered entity, defined to include “a sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association
. . . commercial entity [or governmental entity] that acquires, maintains,
stores, or uses personal information.” 201 Because many independent
scientists are simply natural persons, an amendment to FIPA’s definition of
covered entity to include natural person would be helpful to ensuring
coverage of all independent scientists.202
Second, the application of FIPA hinges on whether the covered
entity acquires, maintains, stores, or uses personal information. 203 Recall that
FIPA defines personal information as:
“a. [a]n individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following data elements
for that individual: (I) [a] social security number; (II) [a]
driver[’s] license or identification card number, passport number,
military identification number, or other similar number issued on a
government document used to verify identity; (III) [a] financial
account number or credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that is
necessary to permit access to an individual’s financial account;
(IV) [a]ny information regarding an individual’s medical history,
mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by
a health care professional; or (V) [a]n individual’s health insurance
197.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318, 381.026, 395.0197,
408.051; 464.0095.
198.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171; Florida Common Law, supra note 33.
199.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
200.
See id. § 501.171; Independent Scientists: Young Researchers Producing
Removeable Research, supra note 92.
201.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
202.
See id.; Independent Scientists:
Young Researchers Producing
Removeable Research, supra note 92.
203.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b).
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policy number or subscriber identification number and any unique
identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual;
[(V)(b)] a user name or e-mail address, in combination with a
password or security question and answer that would permit access
to an online account.” 204

Some mobile apps, including PatientsLikeMe, require the user to
enter: (1) the user’s first and last name; and/or (2) a user name or email
address combined with a password or security question. 205 To the extent the
user also provides the app with information regarding the individual’s
“medical history, mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or
diagnosis by a health care professional,” FIPA would apply. 206 Other mobile
research apps, such as Kinsey Reporter, allow research participants to supply
health information without providing: (1) a first and last name; or (2) a user
name or email address combined with a password or security question.207 In
the case of these latter mobile research apps, FIPA would not apply. 208 In
order to cover all mobile research apps, FIPA’s definition of personal
information should be amended such that a first and last name, or a user
name or email address combined with a password or security question, are
not required for FIPA to apply. 209 One might think that these are the only
identifiers that could be used to identify a research participant; however,
electronically—and publicly—accessible property records, for example,
make it such that other identifiers, such as street number or address, could be
used to identify a research participant or a research participant’s family. 210

126.

204.
205.
206.

Id. § 501.171(g).
See PatientsLikeMe, supra note 49.
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(a)(IV); see also What Is PII?, supra note

207.
See Kinsey Reporter: Apple Store, supra note 47; Kinsey Reporter:
Google Play, supra note 47.
208.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(a).
209.
See id.
210.
See Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected
Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/specialtopics/de-identification/index.html#rationale (last visited May 1, 2019); Cameron F. Kerry,
Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today — And How to Change the Game,
BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-alosing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/.
To most people, personal information means information like social security
numbers, account numbers, and other information that is unique to them. [United
States] privacy laws reflect this conception by aiming at personally identifiable
information, but data scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that this focus can be
too narrow. The aggregation and correlation of data from various sources make it
increasingly possible to link supposedly anonymous information to specific
individuals and to infer characteristics and information about them. The result is
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In summary, “[t]he aggregation and correlation of data from various sources
make it increasingly possible to link supposedly anonymous information to
specific individuals and to infer characteristics and information about
them.” 211
Once FIPA applies, the law contains a modest reasonable security
standard, a modest secure disposal standard, and a comprehensive breach
notification standard. 212 One option is to elevate FIPA’s modest security
provisions to the level of comprehensive security standards. 213 Other states
that have established comprehensive security standards in this context that
could serve as a guide include Oregon and Massachusetts. 214 Florida’s own
ITS Act, which also establishes comprehensive security standards, could be
used as a guide. 215 Because FIPA contains no privacy standards, including
individual rights provisions or use and disclosure requirements, the Author
further recommends that FIPA be amended to include such standards. 216 The
privacy standards set forth within the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule as well as
California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 may be used as a guide. 217
This Article has demonstrated that many Florida laws contain some
type of privacy, security, or breach notification standard applicable to health
data of the type collected by mobile research applications. 218 However, these
laws tend to be traditional, intra-industry laws that are limited in application
to certain individuals—usually licensed health care professionals—and
certain institutions—usually licensed health care facilities. 219 Today,
that today, a widening range of data has the potential to be personal information,
i.e. to identify us uniquely. Few laws or regulations address this new reality.

Kerry, supra.
211.
Id.
212.
See FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2), (4), (8) (reviewing FIPA in detail; noting
that FIPA’s security provisions are modest because they pale in comparison to the
comprehensive security standards set forth in the HIPAA Security Rule as well as other state
laws, including the Florida ITS Act); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 201, 110 Stat. 1936, 1992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
201 (2012)); FLA. STAT. § 282.318(3).
213.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 201,
110 Stat. 1936 at 1992; FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2), (4), (8).
214.
Tovino, supra note 6, at 54 (discussing the comprehensive data security
provisions of Oregon and Massachusetts); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 2 (2018);
OR. REV. STAT. § 182.122 (2018).
215.
See FLA. STAT. § 282.318.
216.
See id. § 501.171(2).
217.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 201,
110 Stat. 1936 at 1992; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2018) (this law will be effective on
Jan. 1, 2020); Tovino, supra note 6, at 52 (discussing the comprehensive privacy standards set
forth within the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018).
218.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 282.318(3), 395.3025(4), 456.057(4), 501.171(2).
219.
See id. §§ 395.3025, 456.057.
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however, health data is generated not only by individual and institutional
members of the health care industry, but also by independent scientists who
conduct mobile app mediated research studies as well as a range of other
individuals and institutions that are based outside the health care industry. 220
The significant economic, dignitary, and psychological harms associated
with health data breaches and the lack of generally applicable federal and
state regulations suggests a need for reform in this area. 221 It is the Author’s
hope that the changes recommended to FIPA will better protect the privacy
and security of mobile research participant data as well as other forms of
health-related big data.*

220.
221.

See Klemick, supra note 14; Rothstein, supra note 19, at 425.
See Rothstein, supra note 19, at 425–26.
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